The Untold Story Behind the Sentencing of Britain's Non-Violent Anti-Mass Immigration Protestors

Key elements of personal politics, subjectivity and assumption went unreported...

The tragic news that 61-year-old grandfather of three, Peter Lynch, reportedly committed suicide in prison earlier this week provoked a lot of anger.

On August 4th, following the horrific Southport child murders on July 29th, Lynch travelled to a hotel housing so-called “asylum seekers” in Rotherham to protest establishment “corruption”, wielding a homemade placard.

But soon everything went sideways. The protest turned violent with some hurling missiles at police and setting fire to the hotel, resulting in injuries to four police officers, four dogs, and a horse.

Now, Lynch did not take part in the violence. Nor did he explicitly encourage any. The most confrontational moment captured shows Lynch standing still as police advanced toward him. When struck with a riot shield, he pushes back, shouting “scum.”

Here is the recording. The police officer can be seen making first contact (Lynch is wearing a blue cap):

He was also heard saying, “you are protecting people who are killing our kids and raping them”. Considering the protest/riot was in Rotherham where police failed to stop predominantly Pakistani men grooming young white girls on an industrial scale, Lynch had a point.

Albeit, when authorities later arrested Lynch, he pleaded guilty to violent disorder. Whether he did so for a lenient sentence, cost worries, or to avoid immediate jail, who knows…

Keir Starmer openly spoke of fast-tracking cases to deter further unrest. To what degree this influenced pleas, we cannot be sure. But if public prosecutors promised bail concessions for guilty pleas, it would not be the first time such deals have been struck to expedite politically sensitive cases.

Under Section 2 of the Public Order Act 1986, violent disorder is defined as an act:

“Where 3 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful violence and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety, each of the persons using or threatening unlawful violence is guilty of violent disorder.”

The wording is broad: how does one objectively assess another’s “fear for personal safety”? And even with a guilty plea, one would assume a judge should evaluate material actions—objectively—before issuing a sentence.

Judge Jeremy Richardson KC took a different stance. Just 18 days after the incident, he labelled Lynch a “full participant,” stating, “You were unquestionably endeavouring to rev up the situation the best you could.”

Forgive me if this seems pedantic, but what evidence does Richardson have to determine whether Lynch revved up the situation as “best” he could? Does he have a thorough history of his every action? More to the point, how can a person be deemed a “full participant” when others set fire to a hotel with people inside—a crime arguably closer to attempted murder?

Judge Jeremy Richardson KC

The judge continued: “you did not yourself attack any police officer, as far as can be detected, but what you did was encourage by your conduct others to behave violently and you were part of this mob.” Again, by what measure of proof is Richardson using to assert that Lynch’s actions moved others to violence?

In the end, Lynch received a prison sentence of 2 years and 8 months despite documented health issues, including diabetes, thyroid problems, angina, and a recent heart attack—all raising questions about his capacity to withstand incarceration. Yet the judge remained unmoved.

Here is a video that surfaced of Lynch after news of his death:

Adding to the opacity, Richardson’s full sentencing remarks remain unpublished, even though similar cases involving Southport protestors have been disclosed publicly.

Lucy Connolly and Judge Melbourne Inman KC

On October 17th, Judge Melbourne Inman KC handed mother-of-one Lucy Connolly a 31-month prison sentence for posting on X: “set fire to all the f***ing hotels full of the b******s for all I care,” written on the day of the Southport child murders. Connolly later pleaded guilty to intending to stir up racial hatred.

Section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986 defines the offence as:

A person who uses threatening, abusive words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening or abusive, is guilty of an offence if—

(a)he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or

(b)having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.

Note Connolly neither mentioned a specific race nor any location in her tweet, which she reportedly deleted just hours later. She committed no act of violence, though her comments were clearly incendiary.

At her sentencing, Judge Inman remarked, “(you) intended to incite serious violence,” and that “when you published those words, you were well aware how volatile the situation was.” He continued, claiming, “Some people used that tragedy as an opportunity to sow division and hatred, leading to a number of towns and cities being disfigured by mindless and racist violence, intimidation, and damage.”

To what extent Connolly was actually aware of this “volatility” is not clear. Her awareness is purely a matter of inference, as the judge provided no concrete evidence proving her mental state or awareness of external circumstances.

Then came Inman’s political statements. He said: “it is strength of our society that it is both diverse and inclusive. There is always a very small minority of people who will seek an excuse to use violence and disorder causing injury, damage, loss and fear to wholly innocent members of the public and sentences for those who incite racial hatred and disharmony in our society are intended to both punish and deter.”

Tyler Kay and Judge Adrienne Lucking KC

On August 9th, Judge Adrienne Lucking KC sentenced father-of-three Tyler Kay to 38 months in prison for a post on X stating, “set fire to all the f****** hotels full of the b******… if that makes me racist, so be it.”

Kay’s words echoed part of Lucy Connolly’s prior post, which he reposted after learning of her potential punishment.

In addition to copying Connolly’s message, Kay advised others on avoiding police detection: “That’s 100% the plan, plus gloves. No car either so no number plates to travel and a change of clothes nearby.”

He further escalated by posting a screenshot of an immigration solicitor’s office in Northampton, near where he lived, with details hinting at a time and location for an intended protest.

Unlike Connolly’s case, Kay’s posts contained a more specific and immediate call to action. Yet, he neither directly encouraged violence regarding the solicitors’ office nor mentioned any specific race or religion.

Now, Kay did something different to Connolly. He contested the charges against him despite pleading guilty.

During his initial two-hour hearing, he stated he was “quite happy” living in a multicultural town, adding, “I disagreed with somebody (Mrs. Connolly) being arrested for their opinion, and so I copied and pasted the tweet into X – kind of as a protest.” He claimed he “didn’t expect a lot to come of (his posts)” and that he had no intention of attending the protest himself, which he didn’t.

Despite his explanation, Judge Lucking surmised, “There has of course been coverage of this disorder in mainstream media and online, and you knew that your conduct participated in and encouraged a pattern of incidents involving racial hatred and serious disorder that took place around the country.”

Addressing Kay’s insistence that he didn’t intend to stir up racial hatred, Lucking stated, “You have served a basis of plea today to the effect that you did not by your actions intend to stir up racial hatred. I rejected your basis of pleas. You are an intelligent, articulate, and media-savvy person. You were evasive about your interest in the topics on social media and your awareness of the surrounding events.”

Lucking further elaborated: “You posted as you did because you thought there were no consequences to yourself from stirring up racial hatred in others. You have a keen interest in current events. The overall tone of the posts identified clearly reveals your fundamentally racist mindset… I am sure that you knew that what you were posting would stir up racial hatred in others and that this was what you intentioned.”

Again, this may seem over-scrupulous to some, but if we’re jailing people for words, then does it not follow that we apply a strict and objective standard? What Lucking appears to have done is take Kay’s online posts as gospel but subsequently discounted his in-person testimony as fiction.

Like judges Richardson and Inman before her, Lucking has ventured into speculating about an offender’s inner thoughts, going so far as to label Kay as having a “racist mindset.” But Kay’s posts contained no explicit wish to discriminate by race. For all the Lucking knows, Kay might very well believe asylum seekers come from a variety of backgrounds.

Then, there is the recurring concern: the assumption that incitement to violence necessarily leads to actual harm. In Connolly and Kay’s cases, neither Lucking nor Inman cited a single instance of someone reading their posts and committing violence as a direct result. And yet, both issued harsh sentences partly based on the assumption that it did.

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Thoughts

In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court recognised the risks of subjective interpretation in incitement cases, setting a more objective standard that required an alleged offender to call for “imminent lawless action” that is both specific and likely to provoke such action. The approach prioritised clear evidence over conjecture, aiming to prevent bias.

The point is, when we permit judges to interpret laws written with subjective language, sentencing becomes vulnerable to individual biases and political convictions. Consider judge Inman’s sentence where he openly regurgitated woke political tropes about “diversity” and “inclusion”, framing such political principles as factors influencing his decisions.

The result has ultimately led to individuals like Lynch, Kay, and Connolly receiving harsher sentences for incitement than some who committed physical violence. Take the cases of Haris Ghaffar, Ozzie Cush, or Usman Ogiden, who faced shorter custodial sentences for acts involving physical violence—all of the offenders actions occurred in the context of a protest/riot.

Certainly, there should be consequences for incitements to violence, like those of Connolly and Kay. Whether that entails fines, community service, or unpaid work is open for debate. However, when the punishment for words eclipses that of violence, we have an issue.

And it’s one that will persist until we adopt a clearer, more objective standards like our American cousins.

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